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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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19980112 049

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SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-028

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12 August 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## JAPAN

### France's Accession to NPT Welcomed

OW0408115292 Tokyo KYODO in English 1144 GMT  
4 Aug 92

[Text] Tokyo, Aug. 4 KYODO—Japan on Tuesday welcomed France's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on Monday, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

"The accession of France has brought all nuclear weapons states into the treaty. Japan hopes that the nuclear nonproliferation will be further promoted by this," Spokesman Masamichi Hanabusa said in a statement.

"Japan strongly looks forward to further strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime toward the 1995 NPT extension conference," Hanabusa said.

### DPRK Demands Halting of Plutonium Shipment

OW0208164492 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1600 GMT 2 Aug 92

[Text] Pyongyang, August 2 (XINHUA)—A spokesman for the Korean Foreign Ministry has demanded that in the interests of Asian safety Japan give up its reported plan to import a ton of plutonium from Britain and France by sea.

He told the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY that a ton of plutonium could be used to produce more than 120 atomic bombs, and it is very dangerous to ship such a big amount of plutonium. It would sail more than 26,000 kilometers before it reached Japan.

If the ship were involved in a collision or fire or ran aground during the voyage, it could create a disaster for countries along the route. That was why countries bordering Japan felt insecure.

The spokesman called on other Asian nations to oppose the Japanese plan.

## SOUTH KOREA

### North's Position Remains 'Stumbling Block'

SK0408052792 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD  
in English 4 Aug 92 p 2

["News analysis" by staff reporter Kim Hye-won]

[Excerpt] The lingering debate between the two Koreas over bilateral nuclear inspections is not likely to end anytime soon and will remain as the main stumbling block in inter-Korean relations.

South Korean negotiators say that the ball is now in the North Korean's court.

"I have to admit that working-level nuclear negotiations between the two Koreas have now reached a limit. What

remains now is for North Korean leader Kim Il-song to make a political decision," said Kong No-myong, Seoul's chief negotiator in inter-Korean nuclear talks, yesterday.

Opening military installations to outsiders, as requested by the South, is not a simple military issue. It means a total shift in North Korea's closed-door policy, he said.

"North Korea now has to decide whether to keep refusing mutual nuclear inspections and remain isolated or to give up the nuclear program and live harmoniously with other countries. Only Kim Il-song can make such a decision. Without the decision, further working-level nuclear talks are meaningless," said Kong, a veteran diplomat who is former ambassador to Moscow.

He said stronger international pressure is expected, possibly economic sanctions, if North Korea continues to refuse inter-Korean nuclear inspections.

North Korea, for example, can hardly expect progress in the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) project to develop its Tumen River basin, Kong said.

The two Koreas promised to carry out mutual inspections of nuclear installations in their joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula signed last December.

But the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) has failed to work out regulations for bilateral inspection after seven plenary sessions since February this year and several working-level contacts. The next session is scheduled for Aug. 31.

The two sides, in fact, have not begun full-scale negotiations on inspection rules because of their disagreements over more fundamental issues.

North Korea strongly opposes the South Korean proposal for "challenge inspections" of military sites with 24-hour notice.

Pyongyang, on the other hand, has submitted to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

But South Korea, backed by the United States, Japan and other Western allies, is demanding that the North accept bilateral inspections in addition to IAEA inspections in order to clear international suspicions about its nuclear weapons development program.

They say that IAEA inspections are not enough to deter a country's ambition to build nuclear weapons as Iraq showed.

But Kong agrees that it will take quite some time for Kim Il-song to make a decision. Kim is believed to understand the South Korean position well, he said. Kim Tal-hyon, the North Korean deputy premier who visited

South Korea last month, must have conveyed the South's position directly to Kim Il-song after he returned home, Kong said.

Kong said the North Korean leader will have no choice but to submit to international pressure regarding his nuclear weapons program to survive, however.

South Korea is expected to begin a full-scale diplomatic offensive against the North in international forums next month if North Korea continues to refuse bilateral nuclear inspections at the eighth JNCC session Aug. 31.

South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok will try to mobilize international pressure against the North when he meets with his American, Chinese and Japanese counterparts in Bangkok during the fourth ministerial conference of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Sept. 10-11.

South Korea is also expected to raise the issue at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors in Vienna, which is to open Sept. 15.

President No Tae-u is certain to take up the North Korean nuclear issue when he addresses the U.N. General Assembly in September.

The South Korean Government, in the meantime, is likely to continue its "carrot-and-stick" policy toward North Korea for the time being despite criticisms from inside and out for its "inconsistency."

"Small ups and downs will continue to prevail in inter-Korean relations for the time being but there will not be a total collapse or a breakthrough," one official said.

Despite the nuclear debate, short-term inter-Korean issues including the agreed exchange visits between dispersed family members and joint economic projects are not likely to be completely aborted, many North Korea watchers in Seoul say. [passage omitted]

### North's Call for 3-Way Talks Rejected

SK0708052592 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0500 GMT 7 Aug 92

[Text] Washington, Aug. 6 (OANA-YONHAP)—The United States has dismissed a North Korean proposal for a meeting of Seoul, Pyongyang and Washington on inter-Korean nuclear issues, Hyon Hong-chu, South Korean ambassador to Washington, said Thursday.

The proposal was relayed by William Taylor, vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who visited North Korea June 23-29 and met with ranking officials, including President Kim Il-song.

Pyongyang also proposed giving Washington the nuclear-related information that it submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), suggesting possible U.S. participation in nuclear inspections in North Korea, Hyon told reporters.

It was unclear whether the suggested participation was as part of an IAEA inspection team or inter-Korean mutual inspection team and the United States dismissed the suggestion, he said.

The United States was not considering participating in inter-Korean inspections, and there was no difference of opinion on this matter between Seoul and Washington, Hyon said.

The ambassador accused North Korea of using the nuclear controversy to arrange a tripartite meeting to ease international pressure on it to accept inter-Korean mutual nuclear inspection.

The IAEA has conducted two ad hoc inspections in North Korea and is preparing for its first routine inspection toward the end of the month. Seoul is insisting on separate nuclear inspection by South and North Korea that would open up suspected military sites, some after a 24-hour notice.

Suspensions against North Korea's nuclear program had partly increased despite the IAEA's ad hoc inspections, and there was no change in the Seoul-Washington policy that Pyongyang must accept inter-Korean inspection, Hyon said.

## EGYPT

### Foreign Minister, Russian Official on CW Ban

NC0508115392 Cairo Arab Republic of Egypt Radio Network in Arabic 1000 GMT 5 Aug 92

[Text] Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa today met the director of the Middle East Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, who is visiting Cairo. The Russian charge d'affaires attended.

During the meeting, the visiting Russian official outlined federal Russia's viewpoint on the draft agreement on banning chemical weapons. Minister Musa explained Egyptian efforts to give an impetus to the peace process and reiterated interest in the Russian role in that process.

## INDIA

### U.S. Official on Sanctions on India, Russia

92WP0275A Madras THE HINDU in English  
4 Jul 92 p 9

[Article by P.S. Suryanarayana—quotation marks as published]

[Text] Washington, 3 July: The United States appears to have come to the conclusion that India is pursuing a "military missile programme."

Unnamed Indian officials themselves are said to have indicated (if not conceded) that "Prithvi is a military missile" even while making it abundantly clear that the objective is to develop a system that could deliver conventional payload and not nuclear warheads.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a U.S. State Department official told this correspondent that "it is clear that both a military missile programme and a civilian space programme involve a technology overlap."

On the continuing controversy over the U.S.'s intervention in the case of Russia's contract to sell cryogenic engines to India, the official said: "Russia has not told us that the contract is terminated. The issue is not whether a cryogenic engine will be put to military use or not. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) unambiguously covers cryogenic engines generically because of their potential for military rocket capabilities."

Acknowledging that the cryogenic technology might have now become obsolete for certain military applications in the U.S., the official, however, noted that "these engines are inherently capable of contributing the military capability."

Under the laws of the U.S., therefore, two-year sanctions had now been imposed on the Indian as well as Russian organisations. Irrespective of a "pause" in the implementation of the Russo-Indian contract, the official said, the conclusion of a contract deed would suffice to "trigger sanctions."

He also clarified that the sanctions would be lifted at the end of two years, under the existing law, even if Russia were to transfer the cryogenic knowhow and engines to India. But the issue of political costs might come into play, he said in reply to a question.

**Global anti-missile system:** The U.S. would most certainly hope that a "global protection system" might turn into a diplomatic device that could be used to induce countries with nuclear-weapon-possessing intentions to avoid an arms race in this field. (The U.S. hopes to develop a global anti-missile defence system called GPALS, a scaled down version of Star Wars. The U.S. plans to develop this in collaboration with its allies including now Russia).

The centre piece of the latest plan should be the "kinetic killing" of ballistic nuclear missiles and "not the exotic space technology of the SDI" dream. Washington might now prefer "a mixture of ground-based and space-based technologies."

Speaking to this correspondent here on Thursday, a senior U.S. Administration official said that Russia, too, might be willing to consider the creation of a new anti-missile defence system on a global scale. He clarified that the U.S.'s initiative would not, at this stage, apply to all the countries of the world.

"The participation of (a number of countries as) members (of the proposed global system) is a politically sensitive and tricky issue," he said. "How much multilateral the system should be, we do not know yet."

Explaining, in this context, the "global" dimension of the U.S.'s proposal, the official said "the idea is to develop a system with a potential global reach in detection as well as interception of missile launches anywhere in the world." This anti-ballistic missile defence capability would be available only to those countries which might be admitted to the proposed global system.

To a specific question whether the "carrot" of such a potential system has been offered to India in pursuit of the Bush Administration's efforts to pressure Delhi to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the dotted line, the official said this aspect did not figure in the recent Indo-U.S. talks held in New Delhi on the nuclear issue.

### Russia To Fulfill Rocket Technology Agreement

BK0608032992 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0245 GMT 6 Aug 92

[Text] Russia says that it will fulfill its agreement with India on rocket technology. Addressing a press conference in New Delhi yesterday, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Mr. Ruslan Khasbulatov, said that the agreement is in the national interest of both countries and no other country will be allowed to interfere in their bilateral relations.

Mr. Khasbulatov said his country gives priority to its relations with India and will spare no effort to take the traditional ties to new heights.

#### **Rao on Upcoming Nuclear Talks With Pakistan**

*BK0608092492 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0830 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Text] The prime minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, told the Rajya Sabha today that despite some setbacks to normalization of relations with Pakistan, India will continue to hold dialogue to remove irritants in the bilateral ties. Intervening to reply to a question during the question hour, Mr. Rao said New Delhi should not fall prey to those elements which attempt to escalate tension on the eve of any talks between the two countries. He said whenever talks were slated, such things happened. Something has been done from the Pakistan side to dampen the spirit of the bilateral talks. The prime minister said we should guard against such elements and forces which are trying to escalate tension between the two countries. Mr. Rao said the bilateral talks slated for the 16th to 18th of this month will cover the entire gamut of relations between the two countries, but said there is no fixed agenda for the secretary-level talks. He said New Delhi will convey to Islamabad its concern regarding assistance to subversives in the border states of Kashmir and Punjab.

To another supplementary [question] on the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], Mr. Narasimha Rao said India has been under pressure for signing the treaty, but said New Delhi's position has been made clear on several occasions.

#### **Position on NPT Remains Unchanged; Explained**

##### **Faleiro Stresses Global Approach**

*BK0708112092 Delhi Doordarshan Television Network in English 1600 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Text] The minister of state for external affairs, Mr. Eduardo Faleiro, said today that although India has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], it has scrupulously avoided any action that could increase the chances of nuclear proliferation. Mr. Faleiro was speaking at the Indo-Mauritius official-level talks. He reiterated India's stand that the NPT was discriminatory and stressed the need for an integrated global approach, because nuclear weapons transcended geographical and subregions in their reach.

The visiting Mauritian foreign minister, Mr. Berenger, briefed the Indian side in detail of the recent developments in South Africa in the context of the ongoing movement for the establishment of a constituent assembly and democratic rights for the blacks.

Mr. Berenger called on the president, Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma today. During the 30-minute meeting, the need to continue the friendly relations between India and

Mauritius was stressed. The visiting foreign minister also met the leader of the opposition, Mr. L.K. Advani. Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee was also present. Later, Mr. Berenger met opposition member of parliament, Mr. Ajit Singh. A courtesy call was also made on Mrs. Sonia Gandhi.

#### **Rao Rejects 'Discriminatory' Treaty**

*92WP0272A Madras THE HINDU in English 1 Jul 92 p 3*

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, 30 June: "We can not declare ourselves what we are not"—with this one-liner the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, today rejected the suggestion that India declare itself a nuclear power, on the strength of the 1974 test, as a way out of the suggestions made to it by major powers to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) or otherwise accept safeguards.

The prime minister's reluctance to take the drastic step was in line with the stand taken in Parliament and other fora. At the same time, he ruled out India's accession to the NPT as long as it continued to be discriminatory. He would like to await the outcome of the review of the treaty due in 1995.

As in his recent public statements in Tokyo, Mr. Rao seemed to set great store with the review process, seeing in it an opportunity or an opening for substantive changes in the treaty. India, he said at his press conference, would consider signing the NPT provided the discriminatory clauses were eliminated during the review. "Let us wait for 1995. That will be the time to consider what is to be done."

**Scope limited:** Had there been an opportunity for supplementaries, at the press conference, the Prime Minister's attention could have been drawn to the fact that the scope of the 1995 review conference is limited—it is only to decide whether the treaty is to be extended for a specified period or indefinitely. This conference will not consider substantive changes or amendments, for which there is a separate—and more cumbersome—procedure with the nuclear powers having a veto. The 'review' is merely an extension and is not to be mixed up with amendments.

According to Art. X of the 1970 NPT, "Twenty five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. The decisions shall be taken by a majority of the parties to the Treaty."

The amendment conference could be held only if the request is made by one-third of the members of the treaty. The amendments have to be approved by a

majority of the votes of all the parties to the treaty, including the votes of all the nuclear-weapon states which are its members.

Pakistan was another foreign policy issue that figured at the press conference. In his opening statement, the Prime Minister remarked that "our experience with Pakistan continues to be disappointing." He did not agree with a Pakistani journalist that India had closed all options for improving relations with Islamabad by its stand on Kashmir and NPT.

India, Mr. Rao said, had stated its case in unambiguous terms but, in spite of different approaches, "we have to talk to the neighbours." He had made this point, he said, as he emerged out of the meeting with his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Nawaz Sharif in Rio recently—that "talks will continue, should continue, there is no short cut."

#### **Rao Outlines NPT 'Inequities'**

92WP0277A New Delhi *INDIAN EXPRESS* in English  
26 Jul 92 p 8

[Editorial—"The NPT Mantra"]

[Text] India's legitimate concerns relating to the nuclear issue have figures prominently in its continuing dialogue with the U.S. Inevitably, the subject also came in for an exchange of views at the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao's meeting with his host, Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa. Japan's interest in nuclear non-proliferation is well known and it is, besides, a signatory to the NPT to which India has refused to adhere because of its grossly discriminatory character. However, their differing approaches to the NPT do not seem to have hampered a mutually desired improvement in bilateral relations in the economic sphere in particular and in tackling political issues in general in the post-cold war era. There is not the slightest indication of any kind of Japanese arm-twisting on the NPT issue.

What is more important, Mr. Rao took the opportunity of his visit to Tokyo to put in sharp focus the central issue of getting rid of the inequities in the NPT. The Treaty is due for a review in 1995 and it stands to reason that there should be wide-ranging discussions on improving it in the intervening period. This purpose is already being served by the Indo-U.S. dialogue and now Mr. Rao seems to have prepared the ground for more substantive discussions on the issue between Tokyo and New Delhi. Nuclear non-proliferation in Asia has become the key issue in the politics of disarmament after the U.S.-Russian accord on drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals. The latest Chinese nuclear test has lent further urgency to a proper assessment of the security environment in Asia. The case, therefore, for constant Indo-Japanese contacts on Asian security problems has never been stronger. Attempts to hustle India and other countries into signing the NPT at a time like this will neither be in order nor of much use.

The point needs to be emphasised all the more because the U.S. and Russia have themselves been concerned over the danger of clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons or fissile material to the volatile West Asia region following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The region is experiencing unprecedented ferment. Enlightened segments of the people in each country are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the pressure of Islamic fundamentalism. India cannot but keep a wary eye on the consequent political instability threatening the entire region. Western statesmen and security experts will do a disservice to the causes of peace and democracy by ignoring India's well-grounded security fears and chanting, instead, the NPT mantra, as though it were a magic cure for the nuclear virus. The trouble is that the Western nuclear powers have tended indiscriminately to take an alarmist view of the spread of nuclear know-how to any country of the third world. The NPT was born of such a flawed outlook. Hopefully, a dispassionate review of the treaty will help to bring it into line with the genuine needs of the new world situation.

#### **Notes Conditions for Signing**

92WP0276A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
3 Jul 92 p 9

[Article by C. Raja Mohan; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The recent pronouncements of the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, on the nuclear issue raise more questions than they answer.

He has reiterated this country's opposition to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the recent press conference in New Delhi. At the same time, however, he also indicated the conditions under which India could consider joining the NPT: the abolition of nuclear weapons and ending the discrimination written into the treaty. Referring to the impending conference on the NPT, in 1995, he said: "Let us wait for 1995. That will be the time to consider what is to be done." He also suggested that India is a non-nuclear State.

That India cannot join the NPT is axiomatic, and there is near-unanimous support for this position across the Indian political spectrum. And this position needs to be explained to the world in terms of India's security concerns as well as arguments of equity and non-discrimination.

But it is not all clear why India is raising the domestic expectations of the 195 conference on the NPT and linking India's position to the outcome of the Conference. There obviously is a misconception of the nature of this conference, which is only aimed at extending the NPT either indefinitely or by a fixed period. There is no evidence at all to suggest that the Conference is about to debate the basic premises of the treaty.

It does not need great genius to predict the outcome of the NPT conference in 1995. The United States has



already mobilized enough international support to extend the treaty "indefinitely" in 1995. For various reasons, all the nuclear weapon powers and an overwhelming majority of the international State system now back the iniquitous treaty. There is absolute internal consensus in the advanced world on strengthening the global non-proliferation regimes. Even the few peace groups in the West that have survived the 1980s fully back the NPT regime.

Japan and Germany have had reservations about the NPT in the past. In fact they were the principal targets of the NPT. But neither of them is in a position to challenge the NPT consensus in 1995. Even as they increase their political profile, Japan and Germany have to bend over backwards to prove their commitment to non-proliferation. To hope that there will be allies in the North to disrupt the NPT over the next three years, would indeed be a bold gamble. Nor can New Delhi hope to mobilize a significant section of the Third World to undermine the NPT in 1995.

India's rhetorical flourish on the NPT is unlikely to resolve New Delhi's basic nuclear dilemmas, which could only get more acute in 1995. The global nuclear scenario in 1995 is not difficult to envisage.

Russia and America are shifting from massive nuclear arsenals to a posture of minimum nuclear deterrence. China, France and Britain are not about to give up their nuclear arsenals. Further, the Western nations would move closer towards building some strategic defences to complement their nuclear deterrents. India must indeed continue to argue for the abolition of nuclear weapons. But it cannot afford to base its nuclear policy on the assumption that they will be eliminated any time soon. The worst mistake India could make is to believe in its own agit-prop agenda. New Delhi cannot run away from the fact that nuclear weapons will continue to remain the currency of international power after 1995.

The Western nations are bent on tightening the current international restrictions on the spread of nuclear and other sensitive technologies. National export regulations and international export control mechanisms are being beefed up at the initiative of the United States. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is already a victim of these enhanced proliferation control initiatives.

We should recognize that these controls would not be restricted to a few key strategic technologies but would encompass a range of high technology items capable of both military and civilian use. By 1995, Indian industry could begin to run against some of these barriers, thus hampering the general industrial modernization in the country. The important challenge to the Indian policy makers is in defining an Indian approach to these global non-proliferation regimes. Must India continue to stand apart and pay the price? Or can we actively seek a way of cooperating with these regimes to protect its own technological interest?

The greater challenge, however, is in shaping the Indian nuclear option in the changed regional and international circumstances. In response to the acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan in the late 1980s, the Indian governments have repeatedly assured Parliament and the people that India's nuclear policy will be reviewed and that India will not be placed at a disadvantage vis a vis a nuclear Pakistan.

The Prime Minister's recent statements tend to cloud the credibility of these past assurances to the nation. The recent assertions that India is not a nuclear weapon State, and the continued self-description as being only on the nuclear threshold, and the Prime Minister's statement that India is firm in its resolve not to make nuclear weapons have all come after the admission of Pakistani officials in Washington in February that Islamabad can now assemble at least one nuclear device.

If New Delhi insists that it is non-nuclear, it has the responsibility to tell the Indian people how it proposes to deal with a nuclear Pakistan. There is a great danger to India's security if New Delhi continues to remove whatever strategic ambiguity that had existed around India's nuclear posture.

The latest rhetoric on the NPT has tended to obfuscate the real challenges to India's nuclear policy. How will India cope with a world in which nuclear weapons remain instruments of power? How should it protect its strategic interests in a world of expanding regimes for denying advanced technologies? How can it defend its national security in a nuclear neighbourhood?

If there is a grand strategy behind the current obfuscation, it is unintelligible to most. Or must we assume more reasonably that there is no nuclear policy at all? One fondly hopes that waiting for 1995 is not a characteristic ploy to avoid difficult decisions that need to be taken now.

#### **Charges of Nuclear Purchase From UK Refuted**

92WP0273A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
16 Jun 92 p 9

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, 15 June: India has described as misleading, motivated and malicious, a report in *THE SUNDAY TIMES*, London, alleging that New Delhi clandestinely acquired from a U.K. firm components applicable to its missile and nuclear programmes:

According to the report, India had clandestinely acquired from the firm GEC-Marconi, Magnetrons (supposedly useful for radar guidance and detonation systems of missiles) as well as Thyratrons which are said to facilitate production of radioactive material. In fact, the report has named the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre as possessing facilities to produce weapon-grade plutonium to be diverted for illicit production of "atomic bombs."

Refuting the charges that acquisition of the components was clandestine, a spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs said negotiations for acquiring components such as MO Valves and Magnetrons went back to 1986 and these were undertaken only after full clearance had been obtained for it from the British authorities.

Denying that Magnetrons had any application to long-range ballistic missiles, he said these components were useful only for short-range Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and were not applicable to ballistic missiles of a longer range. Moreover, the short-range SAM's were indigenously designed, developed and produced, he added.

Further, responding to the allegation that the BARC had acquired from GEC-Marconi, Copper Vapour Lasers, the spokesman said the component mentioned above was being indigenously manufactured at the Centre of Advanced Technology at Indore. Moreover, he clarified that in the recent past, the BARC had had no dealings with the company mentioned in the news item.

The spokesman said "the wild allegations about BARC" were clearly intended to bring into disrepute India's atomic energy establishments.

In fact, drawing attention to the peaceful orientation of India's nuclear programme, the spokesman said India's nuclear research establishments were engaged in the task of applying nuclear research to agriculture, industry and health among several other similar fields.

The spokesman added that India's nuclear energy programme (including fast breeder reactors) required plutonium fuel and India had the indigenous capability to go ahead with it. India's nuclear programme could be developed comprehensively and with self-reliance, he said.

#### Missile-Related Developments Discussed

92WP0274A Madras THE HINDU in English  
9 Jul 92 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, 8 July: The purpose of the Augmented Satellite launch vehicle (ASLV) has been fully achieved, the Minister of State for Science and Technology, Mr. P.R. Kumaramangalam, informed the Lok Sabha.

The primary purpose of the third development flight of ASLV-D3 was to evaluate the vehicle's capability to launch 100-150 kg. class satellites into earth orbit and to carry out the basic space science experiments in gamma ray astronomy and aeronomy using the stretched Rohini satellite series.

The flight had successfully demonstrated advanced technologies such as digital autopilot, closed loop guidance system, on board decision-making system of flight sequencing and strap-on technology, the Minister told Dr. D.V. Rao.

The sanctioned cost of ASLV-D3 and D4 was Rs. 17.98 crores, he said.

Uranium stocks: The country had enough uranium stocks for its planned nuclear power programme for the next 10 years, Mr. Kumaramangalam said in reply to another question.

A new source of uranium had been identified at Domiasiat in Meghalaya, he said. Exploratory mining was being done to establish the commercial viability of this new source.

MTCR sanctions: The Government is not aware of any decision by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) member-countries, apart from the U.S., to impose sanctions against the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) for its plan to buy cryogenic engines from Russia.

## IRAN

### Germany Cited for Refusal To Build Atomic Plant

LD0608183492 Tehran IRNA in English  
1418 GMT 5 Aug 92

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 5, IRNA—Two morning dailies "JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI" and "ABRAR" today strongly criticized the German Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann's Tuesday statements underlining Bonn's stand against completion of Bushehr atomic power plant either by Siemens or by any another German company.

The 7.8 billion-mark project in southern Iran, was interrupted following the 1979 Islamic revolution and the subsequent eight-long Iraq-Iran war, broke out in 1980.

JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI noted that such statements, made irrespective of the bulky volume of trade between the two countries, "in fact are a clear confession to the lack of political independence of the Bonn Government."

It quoted Moellemann as also saying that Bonn is not even authorized to cooperate with Iran in the construction of a pesticide factory.

"Therefore, decisions of the German statesmen, in any ground, stem from political principles which are dictated to Bonn from outside," the article stressed.

Keeping this reality in mind, the paper added, the Islamic Republic should admit that in its ties with Germany it would not deal with German officials but rather with "statutes which are being wound up by foreign powers."

How could a government which needed foreign approval for the construction of a pesticide factory be reliable to the extent to become Iran's major trade partner, argued the article.

"Apparently, the most reasonable stand officials of the Islamic Republic can adopt is that they should set political independence as the main provision for the continuation of Tehran-Bonn relations and substitute Germany with another country until the time German officials are freed from outside pressures," the daily concluded.

Commenting on the same subject, ABRAR noted that such a policy had been adopted by Bonn at a time when Iran had announced its commitment to all international conventions and peaceful development of nuclear energy.

"It seems that Bonn, prior to emphasising on the implementation of the decision, has employed the will of others as a pressure lever, however" the article added.

Germany is hopeful to become the superior power in the unified continent but should not forget the fact that to become superior from an economic point of view, it needs an international market, said ABRAR.

Meanwhile, the article noted, Germany is not the sole supplier of goods in Europe and, on the other hand, purchasers prefer to enter into negotiations with those who are not carrying out policies of others.

"Iran, as a major trade partner of Germany, will revise its economic policies if such trends are to continue... if Chancellor Kohl and his aides intend to display power in Europe, they should better prove their political identity and independence," the paper stressed.

Iran is seeking its legitimate rights according to the agreement signed between the two countries while it is also determined to implement its economic projects for the expansion of its infra-structure, stressed the paper.

#### **Kharrazi Denies Report on Nuclear, CW Plans**

*LD0508091792 Tehran IRNA in English  
0800 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 5, IRNA—Iran's permanent envoy to the United Nations Kamal Kharrazi Tuesday denied renewed allegations that Iran intends to produce chemical weapons and ballistic missiles saying that the Zionist regime is behind spreading these rumors.

Iran's nuclear activities and researches are carried out under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, he said adding that IAEA inspectors are free to travel to any part of Iran at any time they desire to inspect its installations. Speaking to IRNA, Kharrazi said that the Zionist regime intends to regain its strategic status in the region by creating fears about Iran in the region.

A report released in Los Angeles by 'Simon Wiesenthal' Center on Monday claimed that Iran, Syria, and Libya were utilising west's dual-use (military and non-military) technology to build chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. The author of the report Kenneth Timmerman warns that unless western nations halt the flow of technology, Iran will probably produce a nuclear bomb within five or six years.

Referring to the dependence of the institute on the Zionist regime, Kharrazi said that Israel is behind publication of these baseless and false reports. He said the Zionist regime lost its strategic importance to the west after the Persian Gulf war and the downfall of the eastern bloc, adding that Zionists were trying to regain their lost status by creating panic about Iran and spreading these baseless reports.

He said that the U.S. military industries which had links with the Zionist regime took advantage of the issue and boosted their arms sale through causing panic and creating an arms race in the region. He stressed that the report of the Simon Wiesenthal Center and similar others were not valid because instead of relying on findings of recognised international organisations which control arms in various countries, they depend on false reports spread by opposition groups and newspapers which could not be considered as reliable sources by any means. This Zionist center has even mocked the reports of IAEA inspectors who have conducted researches in Iran, saying that they had been taken to the wrong sites.

Iran's policy vis-a-vis nuclear arms is completely clear, the UN envoy said, adding that Tehran never intended to possess nuclear arms but to utilise the technology for non-military, medical and peaceful purposes. He stressed that Iran is a victim of chemical weapons itself and has been an active member in the codification of the Geneva Convention banning production, deployment and stockpiling of chemical weapons. He added that Iran does not need nor has any program to produce chemical weapons.

Iran's conventional arms were seriously damaged during the Iraqi imposed war (1980-1988) and due to sanctions Iran did not have the chance to replace them during the war-time, Kharrazi said. Iran's first five-year plan envisages revitalisation of defence arms and Iran's purchases are in this framework, he said. These purchases comprise only 1.3 percent of Iran's gross national products and compared with other regional countries which allocate even up to 20 percent of their GNP to arms purchase, this figure is very small, he concluded.

### **IRAQ**

#### **Official Issues Warning to UN Inspectors**

*NC0408165192 Paris AFP in English  
1600 GMT 4 Aug 92*

[By Antoine Jacob]

[Text] Baghdad, Aug 4 (AFP) - U.N. weapons inspectors due here Friday must behave "properly" to avoid a confrontation like the one over the Agriculture Ministry last month, Iraq's parliamentary speaker said Tuesday.

Twenty-two U.N. experts, particularly those in ballistics, are due to travel from Bahrain Friday to Baghdad, where they will stay until August 17, the U.N. office in Manama said.

"I do not think we are going to act in the same way (as last month) if the inspection teams act properly and without harming Iraq's sovereignty," speaker Sa'kdi Mahdi Salih told AFP.

Iraq prevented a U.N. team from searching the Agriculture Ministry for 17 days until the United Nations agreed to drop inspectors from countries that fought Iraq in the Gulf war.

"Iraqi sovereignty was at stake, that is why we acted this way," Salih said.

He said he was sorry "to learn through experience that all the U.S. members of the (previous) teams acted in a way that serves their own country, and not the United Nations, by involving themselves in espionage activities."

It was not immediately clear if the latest inspection mission would stick to by the same guidelines that settled last month's confrontation. [sentence as received]

Baghdad "has always facilitated the work of (U.N.) teams so that they inspect whatever place concerned their mission," Salih said. "What the next team does in Iraq is its business. It will be responsible for its actions and behavior."

The last U.N. team left Baghdad last Wednesday after having found nothing in the Agriculture Ministry that could be linked to weapons outlawed by U.N. Security Council resolutions ending the Gulf war.

## PAKISTAN

### U.S. Cited for 'Role of Nuclear Policeman'

BK0308062992 Islamabad THE NATION in English  
2 Aug 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Nuclear fairplay"]

[Text] The statements of the Defence Minister, Syed Ghaus Ali Shah, on Pakistan's nuclear capability and that of the author of the Pressler Amendment, Senator Larry Pressler, under which American aid has been

denied to Pakistan on suspicion of Pakistan having built a nuclear weapon, happened to have come on the same day. The American Senator has complained that despite the ban his Amendment is supposed to imply on military aid, supplies of military hardware worth about four billion dollars have been allowed to Pakistan by the U.S. Administration. In its defence the U.S. Administration has said that the Amendment does not apply to commercial sales of spares and ammunition by private parties, in which U.S. government financing is not involved. Various reasons for keeping this particular tap open have also been cited, among which is jeopardy to 'regional security'. The failure of the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear weapons programme does not automatically mean that Pakistan has nuclear weapons or there is more to such a programme, if any, than the one acknowledged by our foreign secretary sometimes back, but it does appear to be discriminatory vis-a-vis India. India has exploded a nuclear device, Pakistan has not. India has a number of unsafe guarded nuclear plants, capable of producing enough raw material for a large number of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has not. Yet the ban on military aid applies to Pakistan. Since the Pressler Amendment is Pakistan specific it does not apply to India. It is to this discrimination that Mr Shah has referred in his statement.

The U.S. government is of course under no obligation to meet Pakistan's military needs. It is also free to observe or not observe any of its own laws in favour of any country, in this case India. But, the question is that if the U.S. has taken upon itself the role of a nuclear policeman of the world, then certain responsibilities also devolve on it. One of these responsibilities is that of fairplay in the dissemination of nuclear technology. Picking on one for any real or imagined infringement of certain self-devised rules of the game and giving a free hand to others to do whatever they like—the names of Israel and India come immediately to mind in this context—only creates the image of a highly biased and at best himsical policeman. This is surely not the way to build the American dream of a New World Order. Pakistan expects fairplay and in this Pakistan's expectation is not unreasonable.

**U.S. Nuclear Initiative Examined**

*PM0408104992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 3*

[Report by Gennadiy Kostenko: "America Would Only Stand To Gain By Going Further"]

[Text] As you know, the U.S. Administration recently published a new initiative in the sphere of mass-destruction weapons nonproliferation. It has provoked plenty of reactions in various countries. A study of world press reaction and the conclusions drawn by experts and politicians makes it possible to conduct an in-depth assessment of this step by President G. Bush.

While giving credit to the Washington administration's efforts to try to limit global proliferation of the most lethal kinds of weapons, virtually all experts are nevertheless of the opinion that there is nothing fundamentally new in this initiative. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote that it only articulates something that the United States is already putting into practice.

The statement regarding the suspension of production of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium, the core of the whole initiative, has aroused particular skepticism. The point is that the United States effectively suspended production of weapons-grade uranium more than 20 years ago and plutonium in 1988. According to the experts, there are enough stockpiles of these materials for a five-fold increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal! So, Bush's decision is of no significance as far as limiting U.S. nuclear potential is concerned. Moreover, it goes hand in hand with a whole range of provisos such as, for instance, retaining the opportunity to produce fissionable materials for space apparatuses' nuclear power units for research, etc. At the same time, there is total silence on the question of suspending production of tritium—a fissionable material without which no contemporary nuclear weapon [zaryad] can exist. After all, only suspending production of this material (because, unlike weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, it does not have a long storage life—its half-life is only 12.5 years) could really take nuclear states to a nuclear-free world.

The U.S. initiative would look far more far-reaching if it at least mentioned the gradual elimination of the stockpiles of fissionable materials, along with a moratorium on nuclear explosions and a reduction in the relevant testing programs. But it does not. Is that not due to transient considerations arising from the worsening White House election campaign?

The press also views that section of the initiative on containing the threat of the missile, chemical, and bacteriological weapons proliferation as designed for effect and primarily designed for domestic consumption. Something that has already been enshrined in international accords or something that is so to speak on the negotiating table is merely dressed up in new packaging here. Some specialists note with satisfaction the U.S. Administration's willingness to support the efforts to set

up an international fund to finance the work of destroying weapons and conducting special inspections, however.

Summing up the assessments of President Bush's initiative, many people are of the opinion that the United States could go considerably further with mass-destruction weapons nonproliferation. America would only stand to gain by taking the lead in implementing bolder proposals.

**U.S., Russia Cooperate in Destroying CW****U.S. To Provide \$25 Million**

*OW3107053992 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0446 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Text] Washington, July 30 (XINHUA)—The United States will provide 25 million U.S. dollars to help Russia destroy chemical weapons under an agreement signed here today.

The 25 million dollars is part of a 400 million dollar appropriation made last year by the U.S. Congress to help the former Soviet republics dismantle and destroy weapons of mass destruction.

According to the agreement signed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood and his Russian counterpart Anatoliy D. Kuntsevich, the United States will help Russians draw up a plan for the destruction of their weapons, establish an alarm system for detecting leaks or problems with the weapons and instruct Russian experts in the destruction of chemical weaponry.

**Yelstin Aide Comments**

*PM0508084992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
31 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 6*

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Americans Will Pay for Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia"]

[Text] Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian president, and Donald Atwood, U.S. deputy defense secretary, signed an agreement on the secure, reliable, and environmentally clean destruction of chemical weapons in our country.

Russia needs to spend 100 billion rubles to get rid of the 40,000 tonnes of these lethal weapons. The U.S. Government has decided to allocate us during the initial phase \$25 million of the \$400 million that the United States is willing to spend to help our country eliminate all kinds of mass-destruction weapons.

But this is no act of charity. Specialists think that in adopting this decision, the U.S. Congress was primarily acting in the interests of its own national security, rightly thinking that if mass-destruction weapons are eliminated somewhere, they will never threaten the lives of U.S. citizens.

"Another fundamental idea behind this Congress decision," Academician Kuntsevich said during a conversation with your IZVESTIYA commentator, "was that Russia is indeed in a difficult economic position and cannot address this problem without real outside aid."

The chairman of the conventional committee said, everyone is perfectly well aware that however great and timely the aid, it will not replace Russian spending and efforts to destroy the stocks of chemical agents, although it will be a major incentive for it to organize the work and transform existing projects into concrete real actions.

Moreover, the money allocated by the U.S. Administration will not enter Russia's economy in the form of long-term loans or deposits and will not be spent on other purposes. The agreement between the two countries envisages that the chemical disarmament process in our country will be funded via a U.S. firm that will win a tender for this work.

According to Anatoliy Kuntsevich, the firm will take part in formulating a concept for the destruction of chemical weapons and preparing and analyzing tenders for our installations, it will recruit experts to assess them and also supply reliable high-tech equipment—reactors, furnaces for incinerating munitions, containment structures [zapornaya armatura], automated systems, measuring equipment, and apparatus enabling effective checks to be carried out, including on the environment. This apparatus only exists in the United States.

Russian specialists will also be involved in choosing this firm. The agreement also envisages that our scientists and experts will work with the Americans during all phases involved in formulating and implementing the plans for the destruction and salvaging of chemical weapons. The projects themselves will be the incarnation of all our countries' best and most effective achievements in this field.

Provisions have been made for a special center to be set up based on the Russian conventional committee to exercise national and international supervision of the chemical weapons destruction process. Our specialists hope to recruit not only U.S. but also European firms to take part in the program for the chemical demilitarization of Russia, in particular to create comfortable population centers and social facilities in line with high international standards in terms of living conditions.

"We think," Academician Kuntsevich told your IZVESTIYA commentator, "that highly developed countries can help Russia in destroying and salvaging chemical weapons in highly varied areas, including meeting the needs of the local population and personnel working at the installations eliminating the toxic chemical agents as far as improving their living and working conditions is concerned."

What will the first \$25 million in U.S. aid be used for? According to the chairman of the conventional committee, it will be used to assess the possibilities of reorienting a chemical plant that was at one time engaged in producing

chemical agents to destroy these agents and also to conduct expert analysis of the largest chemical weapons stocks—lewisite and mustard gas. They were formed back in the forties and present the greatest environmental concern today.

Kuntsevich thinks that these toxic chemical agents should be destroyed on site.

The academician thinks that the projects prepared for international tender accord with the highest requirements of absolute reliability, guaranteed security, and environmental cleanliness. Admittedly, they will also be comprehensively evaluated not only by international experts, but also by the population of those areas where it is planned to build the installations to destroy the toxic chemical agents, and will only be accepted for implementation with their consent.

Incidentally, President Boris Yeltsin recently published a special ordinance on priority measures to prepare to implement Russia's international pledges in the sphere of destroying chemical weapons stocks, an ordinance which makes provision for a whole series of specific measures and concessions with regard to developing the social infrastructure, improving material and social provisioning for workers and the population of areas where the installations destroying the toxic chemical agents are sited, and ensuring priority supplies of food and industrial commodities for them.

When will the Russian-U.S. agreement start producing a real return? After a competition has been held in the United States to find the firm to whom to entrust cooperation with Russia's conventional committee.

According to Anatoliy Kuntsevich, this work will take several months under U.S. legal norms and regulations. Then the plans will be studied, the best one will be established, and experimental design work carried out—that will take roughly a year. It will take another year to organize the full-scale process for destroying one of the most dangerous kinds of mass-destruction weapons. So, 1995 may see the launch of the program.

We are in no hurry," Anatoliy Kuntsevich said before flying off to Washington. "The main thing is to start the process of ridding mankind of lethal weapons. One of the main priorities should be to ensure not only that our people are absolutely secure, but also that the population, the natural environment, and ecology of other countries are, too. That is the crux and purpose of Russian-U.S. cooperation."

#### Use of Modern Arms for Ecological Monitoring

LD0608161892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1355 GMT 5 Aug 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyubov Dunayeva]

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS—A "Global Ecological Monitoring" meeting, to be held in the town of Dubna,

near Moscow, on August 8, will discuss the idea of setting up a space-atmosphere-earth ecological monitoring system with the use of modern types of weapons for this purpose. The meeting will be attended by representatives from the military-industrial complexes of Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and also from the aerospace industries of the United States and other foreign countries. This was divulged today at a press conference here by Rostislav Sergeyev, chairman of the Ecological Security Foreign Political Association's Council.

The idea of using modern weapons to resolve ecological problems belongs to Edward Teller, "father" of the American hydrogen bomb and one of the masterminds of the Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI] programme.

A section of the SDI programme includes a monitoring system, incorporating ground-based, air and space facilities. The authors of the "Global Space Monitoring" project also plan to employ similar means, including Soviet SS-18 and RS-20 missiles, which can be used to orbit monitoring satellites.

The implementation of this programme, the authors of the project believe, will provide periodic and reliable information on the ecological situation in unfavourable zones, needed to take timely precautionary measures. "Furthermore, as the implementation of the project proceeds," Sergeyev stressed, "we will be able to expand the range of the nature-protection programme, particularly for economic needs, primarily agriculture."

The Dubna meeting will be held in camera.

### **Russia To Help E. Europe Modernize Reactors**

*PM0408112392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Aug 92 First Edition p 1*

[Report of an interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian Federation atomic energy minister by Yelizaveta Leontyeva, under the "Question to the Minister" rubric; place and date not given: "We Should Stick This Out Together"]

[Text] Hermann Kreiner, German representative of the international organization of nuclear power station operators, stated that dozens of reactor units in power stations in East Europe should be taken off line immediately.

It also follows from what he said that the Western members of the organization are stepping up aid to their Eastern neighbors in the matter of improving reactor safety.

Hermann Kreiner's announcement directly concerns Russia, since many nuclear power stations in East European countries were designed and built with the assistance of Soviet specialists.

Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian Federation atomic energy minister:

The issue of reactor safety is undoubtedly a joint matter. I should say that during the period of perestroika in East Europe our ties were broken. I respect the course taken by these countries toward autonomous development, but their keenness for political freedoms should not block the sensible desire to undertake joint work to improve reactor safety. I would go further—the desire to find a joint outlet to the Western market in this field.

As far as the modernization of the stations is concerned, it is possible that some people will try to do without our specialists who know these reactors well. But I nevertheless hope that no reliable firm will embark on modernization without the people who designed and built the stations. Hoping that this is the case, we intend to start exchanging information and experts literally tomorrow, having approved this work at state level.

### **Russian 'Experts' To Join UN Inspectors in Iraq**

*PM0408154392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "Russian Experts To Look for S. Husayn's Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Following the international experts' failure to discover at the Ministry of Agriculture in Baghdad any documents and materials referring to the production of weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations will send a fresh group of inspectors to Iraq. It should arrive in Baghdad by the end of the week.

It is so far unknown whether the Iraqi authorities intend to present this group of inspectors with the same obstacles as the previous group. It is interesting that experts from Russia are included in the new group's composition, however.

### **Russian Ministry on Sending Warships to Gulf**

*PM0508181692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by Gennadiy Charodeyev on a press briefing given by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman S. Yastrzhembskiy; date not given: "Russian Warships Will Be Sent to Persian Gulf"]

[Text] Certain Japanese politicians have recently made statements which, in the view of the Russian Foreign Ministry, misrepresent the Russian side's approach to talks on a peace treaty with Japan, and also Russian foreign policy in general.

"In this way," S. Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, stressed at a briefing, "they are trying, without foundation, to accuse Russia of insincerity." These anti-Russian statements have recently become admirably systematic in Japan. High-ranking Japanese Government officials are

also becoming involved in this campaign, among them Masajuro Shiokawa, minister of home affairs.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman specified that a verbal protest was made by Deputy Foreign Minister G. Kunadze in a talk with the Japanese ambassador.

It has become known that talks will begin in Moscow on Thursday between Minister A. Kozyrev and his colleagues from Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Answering a question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent, the spokesman at the briefing noted that this will be the first time a meeting has been held at this level.

The spokesman at the briefing touched on the question of Russia's possible participation in combat operations by international forces against Iraq. Here he reaffirmed our country's well-known position on settling the Persian Gulf situation. S. Yastrzhembskiy denied that the Foreign Ministry has any information on sending Russian naval forces to the region.

Meanwhile news agencies are reporting, citing INTERFAX, that the Russian Navy has received instructions, in accordance with President B. Yeltsin's decision, to prepare a warship for sending to the Persian Gulf if necessary. The Russian Navy Main Staff preferred not to comment on this report at all, however.

According to reports by various agencies, citing anonymous sources at the Defense Ministry, it has also been decided to send one ship to join the multinational forces to blockade Yugoslavia, and another to the shores of Romania (apparently in connection with the events in the Dniester region—editor's note).

S. Yastrzhembskiy stated that nobody has consulted the Foreign Ministry on this question. The experts in diplomacy think that sending ships would be detrimental to Russia's interests and to the country's prestige in the Balkans.

#### **Russia Welcomes France's Joining of NPT**

LD0408184992 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1730 GMT 4 Aug 92

[By *ITAR-TASS*]

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—The Foreign Ministry of Russia distributed the following statement here today:

The acting charge de affaires of France presented a document on France's joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation on August the 3rd, 1992.

Russia accepted a report on France's officially joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with great satisfaction. This momentous foreign-policy step taken by the leadership of a state possessing nuclear weapon will, undoubtedly, become a significant contribution to the cause of strengthening international security and strategic stability, serve the universalization of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international regime formed on its basis. With France joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty all five nuclear powers have become its participants.

France's decision is a striking evidence of the treaty's effectiveness and is a powerful incentive for its universal implementation. The French Republic's participation in the treaty will, undoubtedly, create favourable conditions for closer cooperation of supporters of the idea of nuclear non-proliferation, especially on the threshold of the forthcoming conference to consider the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which has the biggest number of participants as compared with other international agreements aimed at limiting armaments.

#### **Russian Nuclear Scientists Offered Jobs in West**

PM0408120592 Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian* 30 Jul 92 p 2

[Report by K. Belyaninov: "Do Not Quit Your Nuclear Electric Power Station Needlessly"]

[Text] Housewives take note: If rumors about the large-scale departure of our nuclear scientists abroad appear in the press, expect higher prices. That is what happened at the end of December and then in April and May, and subsequently the two processes have showed no abating. The other day *ITAR-TASS* reported that a Belgian recruitment agency, after discovering that the international market was suffering from a dreadful shortage of nuclear scientists, contacted specialists from the Atomic Reactor Scientific Research Institute in Dimitrovgrad and offered jobs in the West on the most favorable terms to all those who wanted them.

This report was received with great interest at the institute itself. Chief Engineer V. Khofanov, for example, reported that he had heard nothing of the kind and that in general if people had been offered work in the West the institute "would have been all ears long ago." Deputy Director Yu. Kharlamov confirmed that the Belgians had actually offered some work in Southeast Asia, but no contracts had yet be shown. Commercial Director A. Kosorukov said that negotiations are under way, but the matter is "delicate and commercial," so "he does not intend to divulge any details."

"Even if such an offer were made, I see no obstacles to a contract being concluded: The Dimitrovgrad scientific research institute has not the slightest bearing on any defense production units," said Aleksandr Shtangeyev, deputy chief of an administration of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy.

According to ministry staff, such offers usually remain just that. Private companies simply do not have the expertise really to assess the level of specialists's skill or to find work for them. Therefore, after sounding out the market and discovering the nuclear scientists' attitude, the representatives of Western firms usually return home with a sense of having done their duty.



Moreover, in the West the diplomas of only a few Russian VUZ' [higher educational institutions]—Moscow State University, the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, and Moscow's Bauman Higher Technical School—are rated. So quite often a reputable doctor of sciences, an alumnus of, say, the Leningrad Polytechnic, has to confirm his VUZ diploma, let alone his academic degree. Therefore the situation whereby a Soviet academician who has left for the West works as a laboratory assistant is not at all extraordinary.

Nuclear scientists are indeed leaving, however. As part of an agreement on scientific cooperation with the United States several dozen of our specialists have gone abroad with their families. It is planned to set up a scientific center in Switzerland and invite around 60 Russian specialists. Contracts are being signed by purely "civil" nuclear institutes—the Nuclear Electric Power Station All-Union Scientific Research Institute and a subdivision of the "Energiya" Science and Production Association. But, only two people have applied privately to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy for permission to leave. As pointed out at the ministry, a conversation was held with them, after which they fully realized their mistake.

So, if Belgians come to your nuclear facility, do not rush to pack your bags.

#### **Russia Seeks Western Aid With Kola Reactor Waste**

*LD0608071792 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1500 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[Text] Russia hopes for aid from Western companies to deal with radioactive waste in the Kola peninsula. There is much radioactive waste in Kola, including waste from nuclear-powered vessels. The Norwegian authorities were told recently that reactors have been sunk into the Barents Sea and that there is a danger of the radioactive fuel leaking into the sea from these reactors. The Russians are now asking the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen Institute to help establish links with Western enterprises. Ulla-Maria Johansen reports from Oslo:

[Johansen] A scientist at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, (Rune Kastberg), says that the management of the Severodvinsk shipyard in Archangelsk has turned to the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and asked it to mediate contacts with Western companies. The Russian authorities hope for cooperation with Western companies in the management of their great problems with radioactive waste. This especially concerns nuclear-powered submarines and other warships in the Kola peninsula, which have been taken out of use and which are rusting and endangering the environment. The environmental problems caused by radioactive waste are increasing all the time. The existing Russian institutions cannot manage them alone, says (Rune Kastberg). From the Western companies Russia hopes to get know how and investments, not so much technology, says (Kastberg).

According to the latest reports, reactors from submarines and nuclear-powered icebreakers were thrown straight into the sea off Novaya Zemlya in the 1980's. The Russian authorities have confirmed to the Norwegian Nuclear Inspection Institute the reports saying that 12 nuclear reactors were thrown into the sea off Novaya Zemlya in the period from the 1960's to 1982. Earlier, the Russian authorities partially confirmed the allegations according to which radioactive waste was irresponsibly stored in the Kola Peninsula both on board vessels in ports and on land.

#### **Russia Hosts Conference on Nuclear Deterrence**

*LD3007180792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 30 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—A conference "Nuclear Deterrence after Cold War" opened in the building of the Russian Parliament in Moscow on Thursday.

Addressing the conference, First Deputy Russian Defence Minister, Andrey Kokoshin, said that the problem of ensuring reliable nuclear deterrence and prevention of another world war is one of the main elements of Russia's military doctrine.

Kokoshin said that nuclear deterrence is playing an important role in the policy of the United States of America and other nuclear powers.

"Therefore it is important to thoroughly discuss the problem to determine a new system of coordinates of nuclear deterrence and also to reveal the multi-measured situation which has emerged in the world and which greatly differs in its complexity from the recent past," Kokoshin pointed out.

He noted that although the cold war is over, the problem of security still remains. It depends on the balance of forces, he said.

The participants in the conference will discuss a wide range of questions connected with the problem of nuclear deterrence, the role it plays in the constantly changing international, military and political situation, and also problems of cooperation with the United States in the field of "global protection" including anti-missile defence. The results of the discussions will be summed up by the Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations and submitted to Parliament.

Does the threat of nuclear aggression from the United States remain? The Russian parliamentarians do not have a unanimous answer to the question, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Russian Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, said commenting on the problem.

He paid attention to the fact that some of his colleagues, the participants of a recent discussion on the Kuril

Islands, expressed the opinion that "the United States in alliance with Japan remains our main adversary. This is where the alleged threat comes from, from those whom we are hastily calling allies, Ambartsumov said quoting these parliamentarians as saying.

When asked whether Russia and the United States could become strategic partners, the participants noted that life itself compels the two nuclear powers to make this step.

Proceeding from this position, parliamentarians, scientists and experts are to analyse the role of nuclear deterrence in the international military and political situation, and, in particular, the agreements reached between the Russian and American presidents on reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

### **Russian Interests in Korean Nuclear Safety**

*PM3107160192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 3*

["Viewpoint" article by Oleg Vladimirov: "Nuclear Safety in Korea and Russia's Interests"]

[Text] As is known, the problem of nuclear nonproliferation has become one of the most topical issues in international life. It has assumed a special urgency in respect of the Korean peninsula. The emergence of this question is being linked above all with the actions of the DPRK which, having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, has nonetheless been sidestepping cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and refusing to submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection. Meanwhile it was suspected in the capitals of neighboring countries that the nuclear program being implemented in the country was outside the sphere of international control, that it had a military thrust and testified to progress toward the creation of its own nuclear weapons. U.S. experts, for example, claimed that the potential created in the DPRK enabled it to amass sufficient plutonium to produce four to five nuclear devices, and that a bomb could materialize virtually this year.

Recent events seem to indicate that tension in this area has somewhat subsided. Pyongyang has concluded a verification agreement with the IAEA and has received the first international inspections. The DPRK has submitted a list of the North Korean nuclear facilities and materials in its possession. The North and South, which have reached an agreement on progress toward a nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula, are engaged in talks on the organization of reciprocal inspections which are intended to eliminate the sides' existing misgivings.

This is the factual side of the matter. The main question remains unanswered, however: Did Pyongyang plan to build a nuclear bomb, and, if it did, what was behind this plan?

If one tries to answer this question from a commonsense viewpoint, there is an obvious absurdity in creating a nuclear deterrent potential (not to mention a potential for offensive purposes) in a country with a weak economy, a country which, moreover, is located in an area literally bristling with nuclear weapons belonging to the United States, Russia, and China. It is difficult to imagine that a small number of primitive nuclear devices—which is the most that the North Korean economy is capable of—could be pitted against the potentials of the aforementioned countries, or used as a "military argument" in relations with South Korea whose security is guaranteed by Washington. It cannot be ruled out, of course, that the North Korean regime, committed to the principle of self-reliance and known to be prone to gigantomania, has gotten carried away with the idea of building a "prestige weapon." The leaders of that country, whose pragmatism and political experience are undeniable, must have been aware that this was a path leading to national suicide, however.

It is possible to conjecture with a greater degree of probability that, while not possessing nuclear weapons and not even thinking about building them, Pyongyang has, for a number of years, been playing a subtle if dangerous game using this issue as its most powerful trump card in its dialogue with the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Do people in Washington realize this? No doubt, they do. Nevertheless, they prefer to claim at the official level that North Korea's policy in the nuclear sphere is to be viewed as the "Number One threat to stability in Asia and the Pacific." So what is behind all this? To this day the DPRK remains one of the few political opponents of the United States in East Asia, a country whose policy not only remains outside the sphere of Washington's direct influence and control but actually runs counter its interests. In these circumstances the U.S. desire to make use of an auspicious atmosphere and a convenient pretext to settle accounts with the "unruly" regime is entirely understandable.

Judging by appearances there is a clash of two viewpoints, two approaches in U.S. policy with respect to North Korea. One of them favors shaking the present Pyongyang regime loose with a view to ultimately bringing about its downfall, while the other line envisages the establishment and expansion of contacts with it in line with a policy based on a sensible combination of moderate pressure and a readiness to enter into certain compromises. At the official level Washington on the whole continues to adhere to the hard-line approach. At the same time, influential U.S. politicians are coming to Pyongyang more and more frequently to assess the possibility of improving interstate relations, however.

What about Russia? Judging from appearances, the architects of Russian diplomacy are inspired by the prospect of expanding the sphere of collaboration with the West by introducing the Korean problem into it. Hastening to share Washington's assessments and

approaches, following in the footsteps of our partner, we are prepared, it seems, to view the DPRK as a potential possessor of nuclear weapons, and, consequently, as a source of instability in the region. This stance would determine our position in a kind of "united front" under the aegis of the United States actively countering the DPRK, where Russia would be assigned the role of one of the main strike forces exerting pressure on North Korean leaders.

Reactions to our approach vary from encouraging "pats on the shoulder" from the Americans, to Beijing's reserved attitude, to poorly concealed dissatisfaction in Pyongyang. People in the DPRK are convinced that the nuclear problem is only a part of a political pressure campaign aimed at their country, and that even if the question of nuclear inspections were exhaustively dealt with, the "big powers" will find another pretext to harass the DPRK.

As far as can be judged, Russia's conspicuous activeness in the question of nuclear security on the Korean peninsula is in practice reducing its ability to really influence the situation, since Pyongyang is watching our steps with mounting distrust. At the same time, other powers are less willing to view Russia as "an autonomous player" whose interests have to be taken into account. To illustrate this let me cite Seoul's reaction to "history's first" Russian-American statement on nuclear nonproliferation in Korea which was, incidentally, adopted on our initiative. According to the local newspapers, Moscow simply put its signature to the demands which had until then been made unilaterally by the United States on North Korea in connection with its nuclear program.

It is true that it is possible to criticize the DPRK for refusing to regularize its relations with the IAEA for a number of years, but it would be difficult to find more serious charges against Pyongyang. Only inspections can provide a definitive answer to all the questions. Making claims based merely on suspicions is not the wisest of policies.

Another circumstance also furnishes food for thought. Only a few years ago it was customary, in keeping with the then prevailing way of thinking, to believe that the threat to peace in the Far East emanated from a South Korea which had been, as was then claimed, transformed into a "nuclear springboard of the United States aimed against the socialist countries of Asia." Today we espouse diametrically opposed assessments, viewing the actions of the DPRK as the source of a "nuclear threat."

Once again we are witnessing how deeply our predisposition to view the world in black-and-white has become ingrained in our consciousness, how prone we are to swing from one extreme to another, and to regurgitate stereotypes. Involuntarily the question arises: May we not have to sharply change direction, change our viewpoint once again during the next political spiral?

Finally, the fact that Russia is the only country today to have established diplomatic relations with both the

DPRK and the Republic of Korea provides us with a unique chance to maintain a constructive and tangible presence on the Korean peninsula, which would be in keeping with both our national interests and the task of achieving a Korean settlement. But that in turn will call for a farsighted and well-balanced diplomacy aimed primarily at maintaining with both states equitable and friendly relations based on trust.

#### **Russian Naval Commander on Black Sea Fleet Accord**

*LD0608230192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Excerpts] The First Deputy of the Supreme Commander of the Naval Fleet, Feliks Gromov has described the agreement on the future of the Black Sea Fleet as the best solution to a complicated problem. [passage omitted]

Admiral Gromov denied that Ukraine's participation in the joint command was tantamount to Ukraine joining the nuclear powers. The prospect, said Admiral Gromov, was also rejected by President Kravchuk.

#### **Russia Reportedly Given A-Bomb by Japan in 1945**

*OW2807170892 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1559 GMT 28 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "TOP SECRET", a Moscow newspaper, reports that in 1945 the Americans did not drop two but three atomic bombs in Japan. The third one for some unknown reason did not explode but was handed over by a representative from the Japanese Imperial Army to a Soviet intelligence general. The newspaper based its conclusions on a document addressed to the then head of the intelligence department of the Soviet Army, General P. Ivashutin. The newspaper—specializing in journalistic research and publication of sensational materials—also reported that the representative from the Japanese Imperial Army justified this act with the fact that Japan did not wish the Americans to have a monopoly on atomic weapons. "TOP SECRET" reports the Japanese as having said: "We are done for. America will put us on our knees, enslave us, turn us into a colony, and we will never again be able to stand on our own. But if the atomic bomb were in the hands of both the U.S. and the USSR then, we are deeply convinced, in the near future Japan will once again rise up and occupy its proper place among world superpowers." INTERFAX requested the archive department of the headquarters of the Armed Forces of Russia to comment on this report. The head of the archive department announced that he is not able to either confirm nor deny the alleged fact that Japan handed an atomic bomb over to the Soviet Union, however, because this issue is still considered "a state secret."

### **Russian Secret Nuclear Tests in Kuzbass in 1984**

*LD0708170992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 1600 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[Text] Kuzbass has become another location on the map of Russia where nuclear explosions have been carried out. This became known today from a telegram sent by Aman Tuleyev, Chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, to the Russian Supreme Soviet and government. It says, among other things, that nuclear tests were carried out in the Siberian region on the very eve of perestroika—in 1984—naturally, in a state of complete secrecy.

Data from the study also shows that radioactive fallout occurred in the Kuzbass following tests at the Semipalatinsk proving grounds.

Tuleyev is asking the state leadership to help objective studies concerning the radioactive situation in the region to be carried out.

### **Results of IAEA Inspection at Kursk AES**

*PM0608151392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
6 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Vladimir Kulagin: "IAEA Presents Findings on Kursk AES"]

[Text] Kursk—International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] experts, including prominent nuclear power specialists from the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, Hungary, the Republic of South Africa, and China, have analyzed 400 deviations from operational practices in the work of the Kursk AES [nuclear electric power station] since its startup.

Group leader B. Thomas presented the results of their examination to Kursk Oblast Soviet deputies' commissions and journalists. He noted that only a few of the hundreds of deviations from operational practices are worthy of attention, but they do not go beyond the lowest, the first of the seven safety levels adopted by the IAEA to evaluate various situations at nuclear power stations.

This international organization's experts also noted that the Kursk AES is the fifth that they have inspected of late and it arouses no concern as far as operational standards are concerned, including the high skills of the station's maintenance staff.

The IAEA experts will submit their official report to the "Rosatomenergo" Concern.

### **Ukraine Center To Use U.S. Nuclear Experts**

*LD3007141992 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in English 0000 GMT 30 Jul 92*

[Text] Nuclear power experts from the United States and Switzerland will take part in the building of a scientific technical center in Ukraine. This will be a modern

complex equipped with the latest technology. The aim of building such a complex is to use the powerful nuclear potential of Ukraine and solve the problems of employment.

### **Ukraine Remains 'Responsible' for N-Weapons**

*MK0408125092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 4 Aug 92 p 1*

[Report by Vera Kuznetsova under the "Talks" rubric: "Russia and Ukraine Declare Black Sea Fleet Their Joint Property for Three Years"]

[Excerpts] Talks between the Ukrainian and Russian presidents began at 1200 hours on 3 August in the small town of Mukhalatka, near the not-known resort of Foros. [passage omitted].

Immediately prior to the meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said that, first, they were getting together to consider how the Dagomys agreement which, according to Yeltsin, gave impetus to mutual understanding, is being fulfilled. "Second," the president said, "maybe we will achieve a new level of mutual relations. I have ideas for doing that."

Leonid Kravchuk was more talkative with journalists and noted that "if we rely on the law and on friendship, the Black Sea Fleet problem can be solved." [passage omitted]

Leonid Kravchuk gave a rather evasive answer to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent's question as to who the legal owner of the former USSR's nuclear weapons is. He said that the CIS Joint Armed Forces unified command will retain control of nuclear weapons. But when it comes to the weapons stored on Ukrainian territory, Kravchuk stated, "we, too, are responsible for the nonuse of these weapons until they are destroyed." In the future, after the joint START agreement runs out, a special treaty on nuclear weapons and nuclear status would be signed between Russia and Ukraine. Military observers reacted skeptically to these words of Kravchuk's, remarking that the question of appointing a command for the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory has not been solved and that the republic even now retains its administrative control [upravleniye] of the nuclear units. [passage omitted]

### **Ukraine Nuclear Test in Donbass Mine Revealed**

*LD0608165492 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in English 0000 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[Text] The Chernobyl accident was presumably not the first nuclear disaster in Ukraine. Some facts discovered in Donbass, the eastern area of Ukraine, testify to that. Here is Marina Voyna [as heard] with details.

[Voyna] Over six years passed after the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl, we know almost everything about it—because it is impossible to be aware of everything—but we could not imagine that nuclear accident in

Chernobyl was not the first one in Ukraine. Only recently, people in Ukraine happened to know about the accident which took place many years ago and was kept secret. Here is how it happened.

In the early 70s, there was an earthquake in Sakhalin Island, far east of the USSR. The scientists from Moscow Mining Institute, who studied the coal mines on the island, found out that after the earthquake mine methane suddenly disappeared from the mine. Everybody knows how dangerous it is for the miners. Only in June of this year, there was a catastrophe in Donbass, caused by this eternal enemy of the miners. But let us return to Sakhalin Island and those scientists who decided to make an experiment. They proposed to get rid of the mine methane with the help of artificial explosion, a nuclear one, and they had chosen a mine in Ukraine for this experiment. This mine was situated in (?Novokommunarsk) town in the Donbass region. It goes without saying that nobody from Moscow ministry or the Academy of Sciences asked for permission in Ukraine for their nuclear test. Among those who took interest in this work were not only mining engineers and scientists but nuclear arms manufacturers.

In August 1999 [as heard], a nuclear device was delivered from Arzamas 16 to (?Novokommunarsk). It was lowered 826 meters deep into the specially prepared camera [as heard], behind the concrete wall. Nobody knew the truth about the experimental work. The citizens were evacuated under the pretext that some civil defense training would be held in their city. So on Sunday 16 September 1999 [as heard], 8,000 dwellers left their homes.

The nuclear device was exploded at 12 am by radio signal sent from Moscow. It was an artificial earthquake but without great damage to the houses. Radiation level also appeared to be normal after soil, air and water atmosphere in coal mines were tested. Next day, the miners returned to work. It is true that mine methane disappeared from mine. Gas meters proved that. Scientists were happy, as well as military men, because they held a real nuclear test in Europe with a 383 tonne TNT [trinitrotoluene] power capacity. They got very important information for their research work. As far as mine methane is concerned, it came back to the mines very soon after the blast.

People in (?Novokommunarsk) remained unaware for a long time. Only some rumors appeared about the underground nuclear test but the public kept silent. It was only after the Chernobyl accident and miners' strikes in Donbass that people demanded the whole truth about nuclear experiments in their city. It appears that (?Novokommunarsk) was a sole radioactive spot, with radiation level several times higher above the natural one. One could say that the reason for this radiation lies not only in that old experiment, eventually there was Chernobyl in 1986. Probably there were some other reasons and only experts' opinions will help to find the

answer to this question. A group of experts was organized to examine the situation. They have got the necessary modern equipment, which is sophisticated enough to tell the old radiation from the new one. As soon as we know the results of their work, we will inform you about them in our program.

### **Azerbaijan Ratifies Nonproliferation Treaty**

NC0408151092 *Baku ASSA-IRADA in English*  
1537 GMT 4 Aug 92

[Text] Baku 04.08.92 ASSA-IRADA PRESS AGENCY—Today, Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan has ratified the international treaty "on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", ASSA-IRADA parliamentary correspondent reported.

### **Uzbekistan Law Adheres to Nonnuclear Principles**

OW0608181692 *Moscow INTERFAX in English*  
1618 GMT 6 Aug 92

[From the 7 August "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Law on Defence drafted on the initiative of President Islam Karimov has gone into effect on Thursday [6 August—as received]. It says that Uzbekistan does not recognize war as a way of settling international problems and that it aspires to neutrality and adheres to the three non-nuclear principles: not to locate, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Uzbekistan also declares that it lays no territorial claims on any state. Neither will it view any nation as a potential enemy or start combat operations against any state. The republic's defence capability will be maintained at the level of reasonable sufficiency for rebuffing external aggression.

In case martial law is declared the role of commander-in-chief will be played by the president. In the time of war, the president's Defence Council will run the armed forces and economy. The army will consist of land, air, anti-aircraft and special forces, and the national guard.

### **New Issues in Nuclear Strategy, Disarmament**

OW0408061692 *Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU*  
in Chinese No. 3, 13 Jul 92 p 42-47

[Article by Li Weiguo (2621 5898 0948): "New Issues in the Readjustment of Nuclear Strategies and Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The environment for nuclear strategies has undergone enormous changes in the wake of the complete breakup of the bipolar world. These changes have found expression in these aspects: U.S.- Soviet nuclear confrontation has by and large come to an end, the process of nuclear disarmament is picking up speed, nuclear weapons programs are slowing down, and nuclear proliferation has

intensified. All nuclear countries have intensified the readjustment of their nuclear strategies, based on their views about the state of their security and international status. Certain noteworthy issues have appeared in the sphere of nuclear disarmament—issues such as unilateral nuclear disarmament, multilateral nuclear relations, and the prohibition of nuclear tests. The prevention of nuclear proliferation remains the most urgent task to be dealt with today.

#### **1. Changes in the Environment for Nuclear Strategies After the Cold War**

Generally speaking, changes in the environment for nuclear strategies can primarily be observed in the conclusion of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation; and while the process of nuclear disarmament has accelerated and nuclear weapons programs are slowing down, the world faces the danger of exacerbating nuclear proliferation.

**(1) The end of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation.** Ever since the start of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation in the 1950's, the two countries always maintained a high profile of using nuclear weapons as deterrence. With the signing of the "Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces" in the late 1980's and the "Treaty on Reducing Strategic Weapons" on 31 July last year, the level of the two countries' nuclear confrontation subsided. After the "19 August" incident, dramatic changes occurred in the Soviet Union, and the country was no longer a military adversary of the West. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union late last year, the world's bipolar pattern also completely disintegrated. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin responded positively to the unilateral disarmament proposals which President Bush set forth on 27 September last year and on 28 January this year. The United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) also reduced the level of their alertness. On 22 February, Yeltsin declared that the Commonwealth of Independent States' nuclear weapons targeted at the West would be on "zero alert." The United States also diverted its strategic priorities to dealing with contingencies in major areas. On 1 February, the American and Russian presidents declared that U.S.-Russian relations would be characterized by "friendship and partnership" in their Camp David statement. This shows that the bipolar nuclear confrontation no longer exists. Nevertheless, the West is still on guard against the former states of the Soviet Union, especially Russia; and this is why the United States, Britain, and France have yet to pledge publicly to change the nuclear objectives meant for the former Soviet Union.

**(2) The process of nuclear disarmament has accelerated.** Following the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and its disintegration, the process of nuclear disarmament has accelerated. On 23 May, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan signed a protocol to reaffirm the validity of the treaty on reducing nuclear weapons signed by the presidents of the United States and the former Soviet Union in Moscow last year. The

protocol did not revise any provisions in the treaty which provides that, within seven years after the treaty has become effective, all signatories shall reduce their strategic nuclear weapons by one-third. President Bush declared on 27 September last year, that the United States would take the initiative to reduce its short-range and strategic nuclear weapons, and he also urged the Soviet Union to take corresponding steps. The U.S. initiative received a positive response from all parts of the world. Britain announced that it would support the U.S. initiative by reducing its short-range and strategic nuclear weapons. France announced that it would cut its planned output of the short-range nuclear missile, the Hades, from 120 to 30, and that these missiles would be kept in storage and not deployed as planned. The Soviet Union announced that it would take seven "corresponding steps" to reciprocate the U.S. initiative. Not only did it totally accept the U.S. initiative, but it also put forward a plan for reducing more nuclear weapons than the U.S. would reduce. Under such circumstances, NATO defense ministers decided on 17 October to cut 80 percent of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. President Bush, in his state of the union address on 28 January this year, again set forth a new unilateral nuclear disarmament plan to make another substantial cut in the United States' strategic nuclear weapons. This new plan involved land- and sea-based and plane-carried strategic nuclear weapons. The next day, Russian President Yeltsin responded positively to Bush's unilateral nuclear disarmament plan, and announced that Russia would substantially reduce its strategic nuclear weapons. Then, the two countries promptly consulted with one another on this issue and planned to sign a new accord when Yeltsin visited the United States this summer.

Regionally speaking, nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are to be cut most substantially since most of the U.S. and Soviet (Russian) short-range and tactical nuclear weapons are there. This reflects the enormous changes that have taken place in the state of European security in recent years. Regarding the types of nuclear weapons subject to reduction, they cover almost all types of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, including submarine-launched missiles and other types that the United States was unwilling to cut. This has laid a very good foundation for the United States and Russia to further cut their nuclear weapons.

**(3) Nuclear weapons programs have slowed down.** Nuclear countries such as the United States and Russia have not abandoned their nuclear weapons modernization programs; however, compared with the past, the quantities have been reduced, the size of the programs has been reduced, and the speed has slowed down. As early as 1990, the United States had already scrapped the plan to modernize its short-range and tactical nuclear weapons. It declared last year that it would halt the development of the mobile MX intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Midgetman, a small ICBM. This year, the United States has again reduced the purchase of B-2 strategic bombers

from 75 to 20, and it will halt production of some advanced nuclear weapons. In his 1993 defense budget, President Bush calls for suspending the production of B-2 strategic bombers, Seawolf nuclear submarines, and nuclear warheads. According to U.S. media, the United States will freeze the production of nearly all newly designed weapons. The United States has also revised and reduced the size of its Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. On the part of the Soviet Union, it declared last year that it would stop the development of small mobile ICBM's and would not increase the number of, or improve, its mobile, rail-based ICBM's. Furthermore, the Russian parliament, in a retrenchment budget approved in late January 1992, reduced this year's budget for purchasing weapons to less than one-seventh of that of 1991. This has compelled Russia to postpone or even halt its programs of improving and developing certain nuclear weapons. When Yeltsin visited France in early February 1992, France also had slowed some of its nuclear development plans.

The deceleration of nuclear weapons modernization programs and the acceleration of nuclear disarmament influence and enhance one another. On the one hand, the acceleration of nuclear disarmament has directly decelerated the process of nuclear weapons modernization programs; on the other hand, the deceleration or the scrapping of certain nuclear development plans has created a counteraction that can expedite the process of nuclear disarmament. In this sense, shrinking the modernization plans for nuclear weapons or imposing a moratorium on these plans or scrapping some parts of these plans are important aspects of nuclear disarmament.

**(4) Nuclear proliferation intensifies.** Nuclear proliferation is now an issue that has caught worldwide attention. The fact that an increasing number of countries want to own nuclear weapons shows the demand of nuclear proliferation. With the bipolar pattern disintegrated, the world has become increasingly multipolarized, and the previous regional conflicts triggered by U.S.-Soviet rivalry have been settled or nearly settled. This has created a new vacuum of strength, however. This situation and the rise of nationalism, religious forces, and regional powers have created certain factors that lead to instability, and some countries' sense of insecurity has heightened. In their search for national security, many countries may opt for nuclear weapons as their means of deterrence, because weak countries can use a small quantity of nuclear weapons to deter military interference from much more powerful countries. Besides, the technology needed for the development of nuclear weapons is much lower and much cheaper than what is needed for the development of certain advanced conventional weapons systems, and the networks that have to be established to track down targets are also much more simple. Therefore, as far as these countries are concerned, ownership of nuclear weapons may be very appealing. For regional powers, the ownership of nuclear weapons can also elevate their status in their own

regions. According to an estimate made by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, by the end of this century, 15-20 countries in unstable regions might have nuclear capabilities, and some of them will possess nuclear weapons.

As for the supply of nuclear weapons, the international community has pinpointed the main source of nuclear proliferation to the former Soviet Union. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has transformed one nuclear power into four nuclear countries. In the West, it is even believed that this transformation is in itself a matter of nuclear proliferation. Previously, there were only five permanent members of the Security Council, each of whom acknowledged the possession of nuclear weapons. Now there are eight countries that have made that acknowledgment—in the order of the amount of nuclear weapons they possess: the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Britain, France, Byelarus, and China. Second, there have been indications of control being lost over the former Soviet Union's nuclear weaponry systems; facilities, technology, and materials for making nuclear weapons; and nuclear scientists. Therefore, the prevention of nuclear proliferation is a pressing and serious issue.

## **2. Readjustment of the Nuclear Strategies of Big Countries**

The great change in the international security environment has prompted all nuclear countries to step up efforts to readjust their national security strategies in light of their own security environment and international status as they perceive them. Nuclear strategy, as an important component of security strategy, is bound to be readjusted accordingly, except that the objective, content, scope, and speed of the readjustment are different in each country.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, one nuclear superpower has turned into four nuclear countries, which rank second, third, fourth, and seventh in the world in terms of the amount of nuclear weapons they possess. The question of who should inherit and control the nuclear legacy left over from the former Soviet Union or the crucial issue of who could press the nuclear button has drawn worldwide attention. Through consultations, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan have agreed to turn the nuclear button over to Russian President Yeltsin on condition that he consult with the other three presidents when using the button.

Soon afterwards, the CIS, headed by Russia, accelerated the pace of readjusting its nuclear strategy. Judging from the current situation, the readjustment has been carried out in the following aspects: First, it has abandoned the two targets of waging a nuclear war and aiming its nuclear weapons against the United States and its Western allies. Second, it has set up two goals: the so-called "four in one" and the effect of minimum nuclear deterrent. The former refers to the goal of turning Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan into nuclear-free countries while allowing Russia to keep nuclear



weapons; the latter refers to the proportionate and gradual reduction of nuclear weapons to the minimum amount for effecting deterrence, or to 2,000-2,500 nuclear warheads. Third, It has adopted the specific measures of lowering nuclear war preparedness to zero alert, drastically reducing nuclear weapons, curbing nuclear tests (for one year), partially halting the deployment of nuclear weapons, halting or reducing the production of certain nuclear weapons and materials, and partly halting the plan for developing nuclear weapons. If the CIS can realize its readjusted nuclear strategy, we will see a nuclear force with the following manifestations: 1) Ground nuclear weapons will exist only in Russia; 2) nuclear targets will no longer be aimed at the Western countries; 3) the amount of nuclear weapons will be reduced drastically; 4) the nuclear force will be restricted to defensive purpose. This will completely change the former Soviet Union's nuclear strategy and exert a significant influence on the world.

The CIS's effort to readjust the nuclear strategy has been hampered by certain circles from within, however. 1) Disputes and differences of opinion between Ukraine and Russia may deflate the goal of "four in one"; 2) instability within the CIS has brought about a number of destabilizing factors in readjusting the nuclear strategy; 3) the issue of nuclear proliferation remains rather serious as seen from recent reports on smuggling and losing of control over nuclear weapons. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether readjustment of the nuclear strategy can proceed smoothly.

The U.S. readjustment of nuclear strategy is of a progressive nature. Its past nuclear strategy was directed against the Soviet Union. Now that the cold war has ended and the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the United States has thus changed its views on the Soviet threat—turning from a major actual threat into a latent one. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States not only has stopped treating it as an antagonist but has set up new "partnership" relations with Russia. No country in the world currently can pose a significant and actual threat to U.S. interests, but the United States believes that some uncertain latent threats still exist. 1) The United States is worried about contingencies in important areas of the Third World countries, particularly the intermingling of Islamic fundamentalism with nuclear proliferation. 2) The United States actually still regards Russia as a latent enemy state because of the internal instability within the CIS and especially because the centralization of political power may recur in Russia. Among the seven future hypothetical conflicts set by the United States recently, two of them are from Russia and others are from the Persian Gulf, the Korean peninsula, the Philippines, and Panama. 3) To maintain its position as the sole superpower in the world, the United States even sees its own Western allies as "latent antagonists." For this reason, the United States Department of Defense has called for guarding against Germany and Japan, who may become "global competitors" contending with the United States.

The United States views threats directly affect the readjustment of its national security and military strategies. Regarding readjustment of nuclear strategy, the United States has readjusted its selection of nuclear targets, state of alert, procedure of operations, and types and amounts of nuclear weapons without discarding its global nuclear deterrence and its structure of strategic forces—the "three in one" of Army, Navy, and Air Force. 1) The United States has given up the nuclear strategy and policy of waging a large-scale nuclear war against the Soviet Union and of a world war and has shifted part of its nuclear targets to turbulent areas in countries of the Third World, countries with few nuclear weapons, and countries on the nuclear threshold. It is thus clear that the pluralization of nuclear targets has become a new aspect of U.S. nuclear strategy. 2) In view of the changed security environment, the United States believes that it is necessary to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament. To this end, Bush has twice put forward proposals of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament involves types and amounts of nuclear weapons. In this aspect, the United States stresses the flexibility and survivability of nuclear power and the preservation of its global deterrent force. 3) To maintain its "world leadership," the United States has attempted to gain nuclear superiority. If we say that last year's U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty shows the balance of nuclear power sliding to the United States, then it is right to say that the United States is actually seeking nuclear superiority after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Provided the CIS approves the bilateral nonreciprocal reduction of nuclear weapons, the United States will be assured of its nuclear superiority. In terms of the U.S.-proposed amount of nuclear weapons to be preserved, the number is more than that of the Russian-proposed 2,000-2,500 warheads and those of Great Britain, France, and China combined. This is because that the future nuclear power of the countries on the nuclear threshold is considered. In terms of the types of nuclear weapons to be reduced, the United States has asked Russia to destroy the nucleus of its strategic nuclear power—the state-of-the-art land-based multiple warhead missiles—whereas the United States preserves a substantial amount of submarine-launched multiple warhead missiles. 4) The United States has set the work of ensuring nuclear stability and preventing nuclear proliferation as the focal point of its nuclear strategy. 5) The United States has readjusted the scale of its strategic defense program and set up a global defensive and limited attack system aiming at a limited missile attack from Third World countries and unauthorized and accidental launchings of missiles by nuclear countries. In addition, the United States has lowered its level of caution against nuclear weapons and has made some significant readjustments to matters concerning giving up or scaling down nuclear weapon research projects.

NATO is also reworking its nuclear strategy. The quick-response aspect of its original "three-in-one" military strategy is centered on making nuclear weapons the indispensable components of a strategic deterrent and on



using them to deter so-called Soviet invasions (NATO's "three-in-one" military strategy is composed of nuclear, quick-response, and forward deployment components. These components are considered an organic whole, and none of them is dispensable). This is to say that the strategy does not exclude the possibility of nuclear first strikes against Soviet offensives. In July 1990, NATO revised its policy of using nuclear weapons by making them the weapons of last resort against invaders. The move greatly altered the quick-response strategy. Meanwhile, NATO's strategy has actually further diminished the role of nuclear weapons, despite pronouncements on maintaining the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Tactical nuclear weapons have actually lost their military value in the current European security environment. NATO's nuclear arsenals have shrunk drastically following the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range, short-range, and tactical nuclear weapons. Last October, NATO announced its plan to slash 80 percent of its tactical nuclear arsenals. The proportion of nuclear forces in NATO's military strength has decreased. The nuclear umbrella that the United States uses in protecting its nonnuclear allies through NATO has further diminished in the changed international security environment.

The new situation has also compelled Britain and France to reshape their nuclear strategies. 1) The two countries have slowed their nuclear weapons modernization programs despite their assertions of independent nuclear capabilities and their refusal to join the multilateral nuclear disarmament process and to relinquish minimum nuclear deterrent capabilities. 2) They are searching for ways to increase nuclear cooperation and have advanced plans for having their nuclear submarines perform joint precautionary security duties. 3) The British and French nuclear forces can potentially play a role in and exert an influence on the EC. EC Commission President Delors asked: If the EC becomes a powerful political alliance, why is it impossible to transfer nuclear weapons to the command of this political power? Some people maintain that "the road toward European unity will lead to nuclear integration." As the role of the U.S. nuclear protection umbrella diminishes, a Europe that is pursuing independent defense capabilities may pin its hopes on the nuclear forces of Britain and France.

### 3. New Issues in Nuclear Disarmament

Efforts by nuclear powers to restructure their nuclear strategies in the current international security situation have given rise to noteworthy new issues in the area of nuclear disarmament.

**(1) The issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament.** Unilateral actions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia)—in September and October 1991 and in January 1992—to slash their nuclear arsenals have injected new vitality into the nuclear disarmament process and mark major progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These actions have the following implications: 1. They have shattered ideological fetters, radically

reversed the slow process of nuclear disarmament, stopped the vicious circle, and quickened the nuclear disarmament process. In the words of British Prime Minister Major, President Bush's call for unilateral nuclear disarmament is "significant and imaginative." 2. Unilateral actions imply that one party takes the initiative in gradually inducing the other to take equivalent actions. Evidently, the United States took unilateral disarmament actions in anticipation of equivalent actions from the Soviet Union (Russia). These unilateral actions were not unconditional. Instead of being confined to mere political propaganda, the call for unilateral nuclear disarmament was expected to produce genuine progress if the Soviet Union (Russia) responded in kind. 3. Unilateral and bilateral disarmament initiatives are mutually supplementary. Unilateral initiatives are particularly significant to promoting or resuming talks. After the call for unilateral nuclear disarmament was advanced, the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) immediately held consultations in preparation for further talks, and they made progress in this respect. Hence, within the framework of the current international strategic structure, mutually supplementary unilateral initiatives and bilateral actions signify the strong possibility of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons among nuclear powers.

**(2) The issue on multilateral nuclear relations.** During the years when the United States and Soviet Union dominated the world's nuclear undertakings, U.S.-Soviet bilateral nuclear relations occupied a leading and decisive position in all nuclear issues. The status of other countries was secondary and not given importance. Now that the situation has undergone tremendous changes, a multilateral nuclear relations has become increasingly eminent.

1. On 29 January, in a unilateral nuclear disarmament proposal, Yeltsin invited Britain, France, and China to participate in a multilateral nuclear disarmament process. Although the three countries unanimously rejected the proposal, it should be noted that with the acceleration of the nuclear disarmament process by the United States and the former Soviet Union, the pressure on the three countries will be intensified. There is a possibility for the three to be invited by the U.S. President, or jointly by the United States and the CIS (Russia), to participate in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process. China has always adopted a stand of active promotion of nuclear disarmament. In a working paper submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission on 27 April, China put forward 10 measures and six essential conditions for strengthening the international nuclear disarmament process. These measures include the convention of a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear states, on condition of the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons by countries with the largest nuclear arsenals.

2. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, multilateral nuclear relations have taken shape within

the CIS. In recognition of these multilateral nuclear relations, President Bush proposed last October that he would hold talks with Gorbachev and the heads of all the Soviet republics on nuclear disarmament. In February 1992, after the U.S. and Russian foreign ministers announced that they had reached an extensive and unanimous agreement on the further reduction of offensive strategic weapons, Ukrainian President Kravchuk said: Russia has no right to represent the CIS in talks with the United States on the reduction of nuclear weapons. He favored Ukraine, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia's holding talks together with the United States and proposed that this be treated as the first phase of multilateral nuclear disarmament talks. The talks would be joined by all nuclear states in a second phase. On 17 May, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that Kazakhstan would participate in talks on the reduction of offensive strategic weapons in the capacity of an independent partner. On 23 May, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement in Lisbon affirming the START Treaty. This agreement made the four CIS nations contracting parties to the treaty, thereby converting the bilateral treaty to one that is multilateral. In addition, to prevent the proliferation of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and to ensure the absolute security of these weapons, the United States held talks with these four nations on future elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Concerning Europe's multilateral nuclear relations, France was the first to propose that Britain, France, the United States, and Russia jointly deliberate on the issue of nuclear security in Europe. The U.S. response was initially indifferent but later became positive. Last October, Bush announced that he was willing to hold talks with the heads of Britain, France, and Russia on the early realization of nuclear disarmament. France is still actively promoting a joint deliberation by the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Byelarus, and Ukraine on the issue of nuclear security in Europe, with the emphasis on halting the proliferation of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Multilateral nuclear relations is thus established in Europe.

4. Pakistan offered to hold talks with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and India regarding multilateral nuclear relations in South Asia. The talks were proposed to discuss issues pertaining to regional security and the denuclearization of South Asia. Because India was skeptical of Pakistan's proposal, the United States followed it up with a gesture of its own and suggested a five-nation meeting that included itself, China, India, Pakistan, and Russia. To maintain its nuclear option, India refused to join the nuclear nonproliferation regime; instead, it agreed only to bilateral contact with the United States. If India changes its attitude, a "three-plus-two" multilateral nuclear relationship—which comprises a nuclear state and nuclear threshold countries—will develop in South Asia.

(3) **The issue of banning nuclear tests.** The imposition of a complete ban on nuclear testing will gradually become the order of business as the nuclear disarmament process quickens and pressure for imposing such a ban mounts.

1. The CIS favors and endorses a complete ban on nuclear testing. The former Soviet Union unilaterally suspended nuclear testing on three occasions—26 July 1985, 19 October 1989, and 5 October 1991. The first and second suspensions lasted until 26 February 1987 and 24 October 1990, respectively, while the last one will remain in effect until 5 October 1992. The country also urged other nuclear states to follow suit, thereby increasing pressure on the latter.

2. Article 2 of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty states that if one-third of the signatory countries request amendments to the treaty, a meeting should be held to discuss the matter. By 1989, one-third of the signatory countries were calling for changing the limited ban to a complete prohibition. The signatory countries held a preparatory meeting in June 1990, and they met again in New York in January 1991 to amend the treaty. Objections raised by the United States and Britain prevented the conclusion of any agreement at the meeting. Participants in the meeting subsequently voted for a decision authorizing the chairman to hold consultations aimed at making progress in resuming the meeting's business at an appropriate time. Though temporarily relieving pressure for a complete ban on nuclear testing, this arrangement may lead to a resumption of relevant discussions at any time.

3. Discussions will be held in 1995 to consider renewal of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." Failure to solve the problem of banning nuclear testing before then will directly affect the treaty's renewal. Mexico and other nonnuclear signatory countries have tied the treaty's renewal with a complete ban on nuclear testing.

The United States leads the opposition to a complete ban on nuclear testing. It has adamantly refused to stop nuclear testing, with a view to developing nuclear weapons, ensuring their safety and reliability, and assuring its own survivability. Consequently, it has come under heavy pressure to seek a complete ban on nuclear testing; other nuclear countries are also under varying degrees of pressure. It should be noted that France, which had always adopted an intransigent attitude on the issue of nuclear test bans, announced on 8 April that it would suspend nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean this year. In his letters to the leaders of various nuclear countries, President Mitterrand suggested the termination of nuclear testing. On 28 April, Yeltsin said that Russia and France would jointly pressure the United States into halting nuclear testing, adding that he would broach the matter during his upcoming trip to the United States. (4) **The problem of preventing nuclear proliferation.** Nuclear proliferation is a phenomenon that runs counter to nuclear disarmament. While joint efforts are made in the international community to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, prevention of nuclear

proliferation becomes an imperative issue. Presently, the international community is laying stress on strengthening the mechanism of nuclear nonproliferation in preventing nuclear proliferation. 2. It tries to make all nuclear and nonnuclear countries and countries on the nuclear threshold accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, assume corresponding responsibilities and obligations, and accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's system for ensuring security and international nuclear inspections in accordance with the treaty. 2. It supports the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones in various regions around the world and heightens the security of various countries in relevant regions so they are free from the harm of using or the threat of using nuclear weapons and are less attracted by nuclear weapons. 3. It tries to make all nuclear countries assume the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries or nuclear-free zones. 4. It tightens the control of the transfer of conventional weapons, which is of significant importance with the cooperation among great nations—the five permanent nations of the UN Security Council adopted the "Statement on Arms Transfer and Nonproliferation" in Paris in July 1991, the "Norms on the Transfer of Conventional Weapons" in London in October 1991, and the norms on the control of weapons of mass destruction in Washington on 29 May 1991.

Moreover, the West also has paid special attention to the problem of nuclear proliferation emanating from the CIS. About the time of the Soviet Union's disintegration, Baker made two country-wide visits to the Soviet Union with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation. The emergency measures taken by the West against the CIS sources of nuclear proliferation include: 1) Reducing and destroying its nuclear weapons as soon as possible. To this end, President Bush has twice taken the initiative to unilaterally reduce nuclear weapons. The United States even offered \$400 million to help the former Soviet Union destroy its nuclear weapons. 2) Supporting Russia's so-called "four in one" principle and urging Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan to become nonnuclear countries as soon as possible. 3) Linking political recognition and economic and humanitarian aid with nuclear nonproliferation. 4) Proposing the plan of hiring nuclear scientists from the CIS. The United States, Russia, and Germany on 17 February decided to set up an international science center in Russia that will offer nuclear scientists nonmilitary job opportunities and do everything to prevent them from participating in the proliferation of technologies of nuclear weapons, missiles, and others. The center is set to open in Moscow in June 1992. The United and the European Community have each decided to offer \$25 million in funds; Japan has offered \$20 million; and other Western countries have made offers. In addition, the West also plans to set up a center of this kind in Ukraine.

## FRANCE

### Government Joins Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

*LD0308132192 Paris France-Inter Radio Network  
in French 1200 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[Text] France has officially joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty today. The documents of ratification will be handed today to the three depository countries of the treaty; Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. According to the French Foreign Ministry France has thus confirmed its old commitment to prevent nuclear proliferation in conformity with the responsibilities which it has always assumed.

### Nuclear Testing Moratorium May End in 1993

#### Greenpeace Protests

*BK0408094892 Hong Kong AFP in English  
0746 GMT 4 Aug 92*

[Excerpt] Canberra, Aug 4 (AFP)—Greenpeace warned Tuesday that it would resume protesting at French nuclear sites in the South Pacific if France ends its moratorium on nuclear testing.

Weekend reports from the South Pacific atoll of Mururoa said there were indications France was set to resume testing with a limited series of underground explosions.

French President Francois Mitterrand announced a moratorium in April saying its duration depended on other nuclear powers suspending testing as well.

The United States has conducted four tests at its Nevada test site so far this year, however, and China exploded one of its biggest nuclear devices in June.

Greenpeace Pacific campaigner Noni Keys said it would be premature and dishonest of the French government to give up on a world ban on testing so soon.

She said France should instead be pressuring other nations to stop nuclear testing.

Keys also criticised Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans for failing to increase pressure on the United States to join the ban.

"There has been ample opportunity for Australia to work with France to pressure the U.S. for a nuclear test ban, for example at the Rio Earth Summit, in the same way that we worked together to achieve world park status for Antarctica," she said in a statement.

To date Evans had shown little interest in stepping up the diplomatic initiative, she added. [passage omitted]

### Former Premier Rejects Criticism

BK0608110892 Hong Kong AFP in English  
0936 GMT 6 Aug 92

[Text] Noumea, New Caledonia, Aug 6 (AFP) - New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger should have remained silent on the possible resumption of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, former French premier Michel Rocard said Thursday.

"Nuclear tests are a worldwide problem that cannot be treated unilaterally, I hope that France is not the only country to give an example and I do not think this effort is destined for failure," said Rocard, adding that Bolger had "lost a good opportunity to keep his mouth shut."

France announced in April the suspension of its nuclear testing program in the Pacific for the rest of 1992, and has been waiting for reaction from other nuclear powers to reconsider its 1993 program.

Bolger had remarked Monday that a resumption of French nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll "would raise the anger of countries in the South Pacific region," who would perceive such testing as "an expression of the arrogance of a faraway power."

But Rocard was careful to explain his country's position on the subject.

"It is clear that France hopes to get rid of nuclear tests," he said, speaking to the press during a three-day private visit to the French South Pacific territory of New Caledonia.

"If it is seen that there is unilateral pressure against the French state that she alone should interrupt her testing and quit the nuclear club, while others remain in it, I will voluntarily speak of an arrogance, not of New Zealand... but maybe of Mr. Bolger," Rocard said.

"Today, the principal problem is from Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, who are the principal countries with nuclear arms," he said. "But, France also has the right to wait for its example to be followed by the United States, China, and Britain."

Rocard repeated that improvements in France's relations with South Pacific nations were continuing, but that no state could ask France "to be the only one to renounce its nuclear (program)."

He also praised the U.S. Senate which announced, with a large majority, a nine-month moratorium on nuclear testing followed by three years of limited tests.

The former French premier is on a tour of the Pacific which will take him to China, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Australia. He left Noumea on Thursday for French Polynesia where part of his family lives.

### New Zealand Reassured

LD0508083492 Melbourne Radio Australia in English  
0700 GMT 5 Aug 92

[Text] France has repeated its assurance that it will not conduct any nuclear tests in the Pacific before April next year. France announced last April a one year suspension of its nuclear testing program, saying the suspension could become permanent if other countries followed suit. The NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION quotes the French ambassador to Wellington, Gabriel de Bellescize, as saying that France had no intention of testing before April 1993. De Bellescize received a submission from the non-government group Lawyers Against Torture/Oppression Anywhere, LATOA, threatening legal action if French tests resumed.

LATOA spokesman Colin Avery said the group was pleased with the assurance. It gave members time to prepare for legal action, which could be necessary next April if France resumed testing.

A borehole is reported to have been made in Mururoa lagoon in preparation for the next nuclear tests. France has undertaken more than 130 underground nuclear tests in the South Pacific since 1975.

## GERMANY

### Siemens To Send Russia Nuclear Safety Technology

LD2907103692 Berlin ADN in German  
0753 GMT 29 Jul 92

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The Siemens AG company, Berlin and Munich, is to equip the nuclear power stations of Russia and Ukraine with the latest safety technology. Peter Schwegmann, head of the Moscow branch of Siemens, told the press in the Russian capital that the company has already begun the development of programs for the automatic control and operation of these nuclear power stations. Siemens is cooperating closely with its Russian partners and wants to use their technologies.

Schwegmann indicated that he is convinced that with the introduction of the new technology the safety of the power stations in both countries, which are equipped with water-water reactors [Wasser-Wasser Reaktoren], will be significantly increased.

### Iran Demands Completion of Nuclear Power Station

#### Government Opposes Demands

LD0308114192 Hamburg DPA in German  
1050 GMT 3 Aug 92

[Excerpt] Bonn/Munich (DPA/VWD)—The federal government continues to oppose demands by Iran for the resumption of construction work on the Bushehr nuclear

power station. "Our position is unchanged," a spokeswoman for the Federal Economics Ministry said in Bonn today, commenting on reports from Teheran about an alleged complaint by Iran to the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. [passage omitted]

#### **Minister Affirms Refusal**

*LD0408133492 Hamburg DPA in German  
1218 GMT 4 Aug 92*

[Excerpts] Hamburg (DPA/VWD)—The Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran will be completed neither by the Siemens AG (Berlin/Munich) nor by any other German company. This was reaffirmed by FRG Economic Affairs Minister Juergen Moellemann in a DPA interview today. "I have told the Iranian side quite unambiguously on several occasions that we will not grant permission either to the Siemens company or to any other German firm to cooperate in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran," the minister said. The Federal Government decided in June 1991 that no export licences would be granted for the completion of the power plant. The construction was interrupted in mid-1979 at the start of the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran. [passage omitted]

Moellemann said that nor will the Federal Government give permission for German involvement in a pesticide factory which Iran wants, mainly to produce fertilizers. "We will not give permission to any German chemical company to cooperate in the construction of a plant for producing pesticides," the Minister said. "We have told Iran that we will understand each other better if you know you will not get it," he added.

#### **NORWAY**

#### **Nuclear Monitoring Project Funded in Russia**

*LD0308214592 Stockholm Radio Sweden in English  
2100 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[Text] Norway has allocated 3.4 million dollars for a nuclear monitoring project in Russia. The idea is to improve safety by overseeing nuclear power plants as well as the base of Russia's nuclear fleet in Murmansk. The joint project includes monitoring by satellite and the data will be available to Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Norway has been increasingly concerned about radioactivity since 1990 when it learned that Soviet nuclear waste had been dumped in the Arctic seas for many years.

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